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Several authors have observed a decline in the number of 
competitive congressional districts during the past two decades. 
Various explanations have been proposed for this change. Among these 
are theories attributing major causal significance to changing methods 
of drawing district boundaries, and increasing control of campaign 
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the decline of competition for congressional seats appears to rest 
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In a recent article, Mayhew discovered that since the middle 
of the 1950s there has been a steady decline in the proportion of 
"cornpetitive11 congressional districts. 2 In related work, Erikson 
found that the incumbency advantage more than doubled between the late 
1950s and 1966.
3 
For the same period Tufte showed that a substantial 
drop in the "swing ratio" (the percentage increase in House seats a 
party obtains when it receives a one percent increase in popular vote) 
had taken place.
4 
Finally, Kostroski also discovered a substantial 
increase in the incumbency advantage in postwar Senate elections.
5 
Not surprisingly, scholars differ in their explanations �f 
these findings. Without doing violence to anyone's position, one can 
enunciate three proposed explanations. Some authors argue that changes 
in the institutional setting of congressional elections have worked to 
alter the outcomes of these elections. For example, Tufte attributes 
the decline in the swing ratio to the control incumbents have over 
redistricting: 
Our data indicate that a major element in the job security of 
incumbents is their ability to exert significant control over 
the drawings of district boundaries . . • •  Ironically, 
reapportionment rulings have given incumbents new opportunities 
to construct secure districts for themselves, leading to a 
reduction in turnover that is in tuni reflected in the sharply 
reduced swing ratio of the last few elections.6 
2 
Tufte argues further that in Senate districts (states, to institution-
alists) there has been no reapportionment and no decline in the 
proportion of marginal seats. Finally, he notes that if House elections 
are examined in states that have reapportioned "there is an immediate 
decline in the competitiveness of the races in the first election after 
the new districting. 11 7 
A second position attributes the changing nature of congres-
sional elections to a shift in the behavior of the electorate. Perhaps 
the most explicit statement of this position is advanced by Burnham: 
Tufte's argument about the effects of bipartisan gerrymandering 
of districts is ingenious but not ultimately convincing. For 
there is a host of evidence . to support the view that the 
most important single factor has been systematic change in mass 
voting behavior since 1960.
8 
Burnham argues that "the very high swing ratios of the late 
nineteenth century were associated with a period in which party 
identification and party voting were extremely salient, by all aggregate 
indicators . 119 In a somewhat earlier contribution, Erikson anticipated 
Burnham's point: 
An increased incumbency advantage in 1966 is not so mysterious 
as it may seem, since the timing of its occurrence coincides with 
that of the reported erosi.on of party identification as an 
electoral force in the late sixties. Possibly the electorate's 
decreasing partisan loyalty, signaled by such indicators as the 
post-1964 surge in the number of independent voters, is the 
cause of the apparent boost in the incumbency advantage. 10 
A third, intermediate, possibility is that institutional 
change has modified voter behavior. For example, Mayhew argues that 
3 
people in the same situation (in terms of information about the candi-
dates) ·  behaved in the same way in 1966 as the:Y did in 1958 but that 
incumbents had more of an advantage in promulgating information than 
they did in the earlier period. According to this view there is 
aggregate behavioral change, but it is caused by a shift in the marginal 
distributions of people across the various informational categories. 
Mayhew hypothesizes that these shifts stem from the increasing use of 
the institutional advantages of incumbency such as the franking privilege, 
or from increasing skill in using polls and publicity. Mayhew writes, 
"the answer to the incumbency advantage question could be a remarkably 
simple one: the more hundreds of thousands of messages congressmen rain 
down on constituents the more votes they get,1111 
In this paper some data are presented which will help to 
clarify some of the issues in this debate. I argue that both Tufte's 
pure institutional change theory and Mayhew's argument that the informa-
tional advantage of incumbents has increased, are inadequate to account 
for the observed phenomena, Thus any acceptable explanation of why the 
incumbency advantage has increased must be based on a basic shift in the 
behavior of the electorate. Of course, a shift in electoral behavior 
may be of two basic sorts, What might be called the distribution theory 
holds that different kinds. of party identifiers (strong Democrats, weak 
4 
Democrats, etc. ) are acting the same as always but the distribution of 
people into these categories has shifted. The behavioral change theory 
holds that within each p�rty-identification category there has been a 
change in behavior. The data I present will provide some evidence that 
at least part of the change occurring is of the latter sort. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, by presenting 
data on redistricting, I show why Tufte's explanation fails. Second, 
I analyze survey data which indicate an increase in incumbency voting 
at the level of the individual voter. Third, I show that increased 
incumbency voting results only partly from the increased informational 
advantage o f  incumbents over nonincumbents and the propensity of 
voters to cast their ballots in favor of candidates who are known to 
them. Both of these factors. have undergone some change between 1958 
and 1970, but the change in the informational advantage is not adequate 
to account for the change in incumbency voting. Finally, data are 
presented which suggest that the inclination of voters to vote for 
candidates they know has increased over the period under study at all 
levels of party identification. 
REDISTRIBTING Al.'ID COMPETITION 
In his reply to Burnham 1 s  comment on his 1973 article> Tufte 
remarks that more important than ascertaining whether or not there has 
been- an underlying shift in voter behavior that would account for the 
shift in the swing ratio is "allocating the effects on political 
competition of redistricting on the· one hand and the increase in 
. 12incumbent resources· on the other. 11 This prescription is sensible as 
5 
long as there is some reason to believe that these two effects capture 
a substantial fraction of the variance in the dependent variable. In 
this section I argue that there is no reason to expect that redistrict-
ing has much influence on the variables of interest. 
In two papers and a reply to a comment , Tufte has advanced 
several pieces of evidence indicating that redistricting has a major 
effect on the decline of the swing ratio. In his first paper (1973) , 
Tufte notes that the proportion of competitive seats in the House has 
declined from about . 20 in 1958 to .13 in 1970, while in the Senate 
(where no redistricting ever takes place) , there has been no decline. 
He then s,ays that "some recent redistricting laws have been described 
as the Incumbent Survival Acts of 1972. 1113 He claims that 11reappor-
tionment rulings have given incumbents new opportunities to construct 
secure districts for themselves • • •  11
14 Tufte goes on to present 
data on the number of marginal seats in Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, 
and Ohio for the 1970 elections (all these states had been redistricted 
during the decade) . Finally he claims that "the independent contribu� 
tion of reapportionment to the job security of incumbents can also be 
seen in the elections immediately following reapportionment in a state: 
there is an immediate decline in the competitiveness of the races in 
the first election after the new districting. 1115 
In his rejoinder to Burnham's connnunication, Tufte presents 
what he calls the 11seats-votes" curves for . California in 1966 (before 
redistricting) and 1968 (after redistricting). These curves indicate 
a ·substantial decline in the number of competitive districts in the 
state following the redistricting. 
Finally , in his article,16 Tufte presents the 
seats/votes curves for Illinois, Michigan , Pennsylvania, and Ohio 
for 1950 and 1970. In each case there is a substantial decline in 
6 
the swing ratio (and of course in the number of competitive districts) .  
As far as I know, this is all the evidence that Tufte has presented 
in support of the redistrict�ng explanation. 
As the reader may suspect , I have several objections to 
this explanation. First , it is highly implausible a priori. Before 
the Court rulings on reapportionment , ther� were fewer legal restric-
tions on the amount of gerrymandering that could be done than there 
are now. Aside from some anecdotal remarks, Tufte has presented no 
evidence that incumbents have more control over redistricting now 
than they ever did. It appears to me that he must bear the burden of 
proof on this point and establish the plausibility of his contention. 
Second, while Tufte presents some data on the number of com-
petitive districts in certain states before and after redistricting, he 
fails to look at changes in the number of competitive districts in states 
where no reapportionment has occurred. If � of the opposing explana-
tions are correct he would find that there has been a decline in the 
number of competitive seats after reapportionment but that decline need 
have nothing to do with the reapportionment itself. In those states 
which underwent it, reapportionment is simply correlated perfectly 
with the change in voting behavior (if Burnham and Erikson are right) 
or with the increase in resources held by the incumbent (if Mayhew is 
correct). This. problem seems to be easily remedied by comparing the 
number of marginal districts over time in states which redistricted 
with those which did not. In Tables 1 and 2 any district in which 
the winner received no more than 60 percent of the vote is called 
competitive, while all others are called noncompetitive. 
TABLE 1 
Decline in Percentage of Competitive Seats in Non-Southern States 
That Have and Have Not Been Redistricted, 1962-19668 
Redistricted Not Redistricted 
.. ., I ,, I ,. I 1966 40 28 
Number of districts 182 132 
8The data are from America Votes, Vol. 9, ed., Richard Scammon, 
Congressional Quarterly, 1972. Entries are the percentage of 
competitive districts. 
TABLE 2 
Decline in Percentage of Competitive Seats in Non-Southern States 
That Have and Have Not Been Redistricted, 1966-1970
a 
Redistricted Not Redistricted 
,, .. I " I " J 1970 27 �3 
Number of districts 177 153 
7 
8.rhe data are from Scammon. Entries are the per�entage of competitive 
districts. 
8 
These tables indicate that the drop in the percentage of 
competitive seats that Tufte found following reapportionments is not 
due to redistricting, since the decline occurred in unredistricted 
areas as well. These data suggest that redistricting has no influence 
at all on the swing ratio. The decline in the number of marginal 
districts is a general one which must be accounted for by a theory 
of the sort advanced by either Mayhew or Burnham. 
Before proceeding with a somewhat more detailed considera-
tion of the explanations of Mayhew, Burnha� and Erikson, I shall 
present one more piece of evidence which seems to bear on the problem. 
In an article on postwar Senate elections, Kostroski found that when the 
percentage of a senatorial candidate's popular vote is regressed on 
measures of 11base party vote·," "national tides," and "incrnnbency" 
within party, there has been a substantial increase in the effect o� 
incumbency on vote percentage. 17 For the present purposes it is 
significant that this increase has occurred in "districts" in which 
no redistricting took place. In my view, Kostroski's results fit 
quite well with the observed drop in the swing ratio in House districts, 
since this drop might well be due to an increase in incumbency voting 
in House elections. Kostroski's research indicates that incumbency 
voting has in fact increased during the postwar period and that this 
increase occurred in areas which have not been redistricted. 
ON THE INCUMBENT'S INCREASING CONTROL OF RESOURCES 
Mayhew suggests that a principal source of the change in the 
number of competitive seats may be found in the .. greater electoral 
advantage11 that incumbents hold over their opponents. He cites two 
pieces of evidence that this advantage has increased. First he 
remarked that Erikson found that the incumbency advantage more than 
18 doubled between the 1950s and 1966. Second, Mayhew computed the
9 
drops in the percentage of the vote that a party suffers in a district 
when an incumbent retires. He found that these drops were larger in 
1966, 1968 and 1970 than in 1962 and 1964. He concluded that "Incum-
bency does seem to have increased in electoral value, and . it is 
reasonable to suppose that one effect of this increase has been to 
boost House members of both parties out of the marginal electoral 
range, 1119
Mayhew attempted to trace the decline in the number of 
marginal districts and the concomitant apparent increase in the 
advantage of incumbency to real changes in the quantity of resources 
held and employed by incumbents. He argued that incumbent congress-
men currently make substantially greater use of the franking privilege 
than did .incumbents in the 1950s. Indeed the quantity of junk mail 
quadrupled between 1954 and 1970. Further, this increase in the 
control and utilization of tangible resources has allegedly translated 
into an increase in the level of recognition enjoyed by incumbents. 
Mayhew cites Gallup poll data which indicate that there was a seven 
percent increase in the percentage of people who knew their congress-
man between 1966 and 1970. 
While I do not have data that bear directly on whether 
irictnnbent congressmen enjoy more of an advantage over their opponents 
in the control of campaign resources than did the incumbents of the 
10 
1950s, it is possible to utilize data collected by the SRC to question 
whether any effects on voting behavior may be imputed to this alleged 
change. If Mayhew's argument is correct, one should be able to observe, 
first of all, an overall increase in the level of recognition of the 
incumbent. Second, the relativ.e level of recognition of incumbents 
versus challengers should alS? show an increase. Additionally one 
ought to find that the increased level (or relative level) of recogni-
tion translates behaviorally into an increased level of incumbency 
voting. 
The data I present below indicate the following: (1) a 
substantial increase in incumbency voting on the level of the individual 
voter; (2) no increase in the level of recognition of incumbents; and 
(3) little if any increase in the gap between recognition levels of 
incumbents and challengers. I reserve treatment of the behavioral 
linkage between candidate recognition and voting until the next 
section of the paper. 
The data utilized here are from the SRC election surveys for 
1956, 1958, 1960, 1964, 1966, 1968 and 1970. These. are all of the years 
in which information on incumbency was collected b y  SRC or in which 
congressional districts identification was provided so that incumbency 
status could be supplied by the author. Unfortunately, only three off-
year elections are available for these purposes, and so some of the 
results are advanced here only tentatively. 
Has there been a change in the frequency of incumbency voting 
during this period? To answer this question for each year and for 
Democrats , Republicans and Independents, the percentage of voters in 
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12 
each partisan category in districts with Democratic incumbents who 
voted for the Democratic candidate was subtracted from the percentage 
of voters (in the same category) in districts with Republican incum-
bents who cast their ballots for the Democratic candidate. Figure l 
reports these data during the period. 
��rst notice that for Independents the tendency to vote for 
the incumbent is substantially greater in off years than in years of 
presidential elections. Further, while there is some discernible, 
long-term shift in the behavior of the Independents, it is particularly 
interesting that partisan identifiers (especially the Democrats) became 
more likely to respond to incumbency later in the period of observation 
than they had been earlier. One may conjecture that their behavior has 
become more like that of the Independents over time, Of course, until 
more data are available, this possibility is only speculative. 
We now examine an important intervening step in Mayhew's 
argument. Has the informational advantage held by incumbents increased 
during the period? To answer this question, each respondent was asked 
to name the candidates for the House in his district , If the respondent 
could provide the name of a candidate, then he was considered to be 
"aware" of the candidate, otherwise not. Among the surveys for which 
we had incumbency information, this question was asked only in 1958, 
1964, 1966, 1968 and 1970 so that the data are a bit more limited than 
those reported earlier. 
If Mayhew1s theory is correct, these data should show that 
incumbents are more likely to be knowri to voters after 1964 than in 
1958. Further, the advantage which incumbents enjoy in this respect 
ought to have increased over the three elections. Table 3 gives the 
percentage who know a candidate given that this candidate is or is 
not an incumbent in all three years. This table indicates that among 
voters in contested districts with incumbents running there has been 
no increase in awareness of the incumbent. Rather, in years of 
presidential elections among voters in contested elections who live 
in districts with an incumbent running, the percentage who know the 
incumbent's name is constant at 63 percent. In off years the figure 
remains constant at about 55 percent. On the other hand, the 
corresponding variable for nonincumbents displays no clear trend. 
13 
During tqe off years, recognition of nonincumbents has declined, while 
during presidential election years, it seems to have increased somewhat. 
These data suggest that the increasing control of resources by 
incumbent, if it has any effect at all on incumbency voting, does not 
directly impinge on voter awareness of congressional candidates. In 
my view this result casts serious doubts on Mayhew's explanation of 
the declining number of competitive seats. 
INCUMBENCY AND SALIENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES 
A critical component of Mayhew's argument is that an increase 
in the' salience of a candidate will have the effect of increasing his 
vote. No doubt the source of this assumption is to be found in Stokes 
and Miller's classic article demonstrating that candidate salience has 
an effect on congressional vote. Mayhew drew the following policy 
c6nclusion from this study: if a candidate is able through the expendi-
ture of campaign resources to increase his level of recognition, his 
14 
TABLE 3 
Percentage of Voters Who Are Aware of House Candidates 
in Contested Districts 
Incumbent Nonincumbent 
1958 57.6 38.0 
(73 8)a (947) 
1964 I 63.0 39.8 
(856) (920) 
1966 I 55.9 37.6 
(583) (703) 
1968 I 63.7 46.5 
(703) ( 861) 
1970 I 54. 7 31. 3
(548) (630) 
<i.rhe number in parentheses is 
an incumbent running (column 
the number of voters 
1) or a nonincumbent 
in districts with 
ruhning (column 2) • .
15 
vote will increase. This proposition, although never directly examined, 
seems to play a large part in popular reasoning about congressional 
elections. The following analysis is designed to illustrate whether 
or not this policy conclusion may be safely drawn from the Stokes-
Miller data. 
Under the assumption that the effects of salience would not 
interact with the effects of party identification or o f  incumbency 
status, the following regression equation was estimated utilizing an 
iterative generalized least-squares procedure described in Goldberger. 20 
(1) Y =" + �1x1 + Szxz + • • •  + �6x6 + E 
where Y 
x
l 
Xz 
x
3 
x
4 
XS 
x
6 
1 if respondent voted Democratic 
0 otherwise 
1 if respondent resided in a district with 
Republican incumbent 
0 otherwise 
1 if respondent was aware of the Democratic candidate 
0 otherwise 
1 if respondent was aware of the Republican candidate 
0 otherwise 
1 if respondent was aware of both candidates 
0 otheri:vise 
1 if respondent was a Democrat (SD or WD) 
0 otherwise 
1 if respondent was a Republican (SR or WR) 
0 otherwise. 
The samples of observations on which the equation _was
estimated consisted of all contested districts in which an incumbent 
was running during 1958, 1964, 1966, 1968 and 1970 taken separately. 
The question at issue was whether or not, when incumbency 
status and party ID were fixed,_ changes in candidate salience had an 
intuitively predictable effec� on the vote. In particular, if a 
citizen learned of the Democratic candidate, having preViously known 
16 
neither candidate, or, .alternatively, known only the Republican, would 
that citizen's probability of voting Democ�atic increase significantly? 
Table 4 gives the regression results. 
The estimates reported in Table 4 indicate that, except for 
1966 when a voter who knew the Republican candidate was more likely to 
vote Democratic than one who· knew both candidates, the effect of salience 
was in the predicted direction. Further, the data in Table 4 indicate 
that in 1958, incumbency had no independent effect on voting (at the .05 
level) once the effect of awareness is taken into account. On the other· 
hand, these data suggest that in 1964, 1966, 1968 and 1970 incumbency 
had a significant effect on the voting decision, once salience is 
controlled. Voters were apparently using incumbency as a voting cue 
whether or not they could recall the names of the incumbent candidate 
in the interview situation. 
The model estimated here is obviously extremely simpleminded 
and, in light of Tufte1s results on the causes of voting decisions in 
congressional elections, using more aggregated data> unsatisfactory as 
an explanatory model of congressional voting behavior. It was employed 
here to learn if the widely held belief that the incumbency effect in 
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voting works through candidate salience had any validity. Based on 
18 
these data it appears that the popular view cannot be rejected for the 
1958 data but that in 1964, 1966, 1968 and 1970 data 'there was evidently 
an independent incumbency effect. In the later period perhaps many 
voters who were not able to identify the candidate for the interviewer 
were able nevertheless to distin&uish incumbent from nonincumbent in 
the voting booth and use that information in making their voting decision. 
Analysis of the residuals from the regression equations 
indicated that a number of cases produced estimates for the probability 
of voting Democratic outside the range between zero and one. This 
finding indicates interactions between the independent variables in 
their effects on the dependent variable; that is, the effect of salience 
on the conditional probability o-f voting Democratic apparently varies 
according to incumbency status or party identification • 
In order to examine this phenomenon the following table was 
examined utilizing essentially the same information that was contained 
in the regression equations but allowing for the interactions between 
salience and incumbency. 
The striking thing about Table S is that controlling for 
incumbency status, in four of ten comparisons increased awareness of 
own party candidate actually decreased the probability of voting for 
him. In two other comparisons there was essentially no difference at 
all. These data must cause scholars to reconsider very carefully the 
maxim advanced by Stokes and Miller 11to be perceived at all is to be 
perceived favorably. 1121 A candidate of the same party as a given voter 
may be more likely to receive his vote if the voter does not recognize 
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him than if he does. On the other hand, if a similar set of tables 
were displayed with a variable indicating whether or not the voter is 
aware of the other party's candidate, the effects of salience appear to 
be much more intuitive. One may only conclude that the effects of name 
recognition seem to be quite complex and that more investigation is 
required before one can conclude ,that increased name recognition will 
increase a candidate's vote. 
BEHAVIORAL CHANGE THEORIES 
The arguments in the first three sections of this paper 
provide strong prima facie evidence to believe that neither Tufte's 
nor Mayhew 1s theories can adequately explain the decline in the number 
of marginal districts. In this ·section I wish to turn from the gleeful 
enterprise of attacking existing theories to the more difficult and 
thankless .one of constructing part of a new one. Unfortunately, while 
I cannot claim the credit for inventing the new theory -- that must be 
divided between Burnham and Erikson -- I would hold myself partly 
responsible if it too should turn out to be invalid. 
The data in Figure 1 (p. 11) suggest that the principal change 
in incumbency voting between 1956 and 1970 occurred primarily among the 
partisan identifiers rather than among Independents. Thus, this section 
focuses mainly on examining the behavior of the partisans rather than 
that of the Independents. The major question is this: is the changing 
level of incumbency voting due to the changing distribution of partisan 
identifiers or to changes in behavior within the various party identifi-
cation cat.egories? Of course one cannot expect a simple answer to such 
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a question, and it seems likely that both kinds of change will be found. 
Nevertheless, I would think it significant and interesting if the 
hypothesis of behavioral change within party identification categories 
could not be rejected. 
In their paper on congressional elections, Stokes and Miller 
showed that "the saliency of the candidate is of critical importance 
if he is to attract support from the opposite party. 1122 They produced 
the following table based on survey da'ta from the 1958 elections. 
Percentage 
Who Voted for 
TABLE 6 
Effect of Information on Congressional Voting 
in Contested Districts in 1958 
Voter Was Aware of: 
Both Own Party Other Party Neither 
Candidate Candidates Candidate Candidate Candidate 
Of Own Party 83 98 60 92 
Of Other Party 17 2 40 9 
N • 196 166 68 368 
These data suggest that while party is a fairly good indicator of 
how a party identifier will cast his vote, the various categories of 
knowledge of the candidates have some effect on this relationship. 
In Table 7, data are presented from the 1958, 1965, 1966, 
1968 and 1970 SRC surveys which correspond roughly to the 1958,data 
presented by Stokes and Miller. The numbers on which the 1958 
percentages are based do not quite agree with those presented by the 
earlier authors but the percent.ages are fairly close to theirs. 
TABLE 7 
Effect of Information on the Congressional Vote 
in Contested Districtsa 
Voter Was Aware of: 
Percentage Who 
Voted for Both Own Party Other Party 
Own Party in Candidate_s Candidate Candidate 
1958 81.0 99. 3 66.7 
(221) (134) (30) 
1964 78.8 94.8 59.6 
(245) (164) (34) 
1966 80.7 96 34.9 
(163) (96) (15) 
1968 77.0 94.9 48. 3 
(235) (94) (28) 
1970 75.9 99.1 36.4 
(107) (110) (16) 
Neither 
Candidate 
95.1 
(290) 
85.6 
(250) 
86.5 
(193) 
81. 7 
(192) 
89.8 
(185) 
8Number of cases in each awareness category are in parentheses. 
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The first thing to notice in Table 7 is that in every informa-
tion category a smaller fraction of people voted for the candidate of 
their own party in 1964, 1966, 1968 and 1970 than did in 1958. This 
difference is most pronounced in the category of people who could mention 
only the candidate of the other party. Chi-square tests for homogeneity 
between 1958 and each of the ensuing years were computed under the null 
23 
hypothesis that the observations were drawn from the same populations, 
In each case this hypothesis was rejected at the .05 level. 
To construct Table 7, all party ideritifiers were aggregated 
(weak, strong, and Independent-leaners) . Perhaps a shift in the distri­
bution of the electorate across the various categories in the seven­
point SRC party identification scale accounts for this apparent change 
in behavior. If so, then one may hope to explain the apparent change 
in voting behavior by explaining why this distribution has shifted. 
Indeed, if the percentage of strong identifiers who resided in districts 
in which an incumbent was running in 1956 and 1958 is compared with the 
same percentages in 1966 and 1968, there was a decline from approximately 
43 percent to about 36 percent. There was an increase in weak 'and 
Independent-leaning identifiers over the same period of about 6 percent. 
Since party is less of an anchor for weak and Independent-leaning 
identifiers than for strong identifiers, the observed change in Table 7 
may be due to the changing proportion of the electorate in various 
party identification categories .• 
In order to test whether this distributional shift accounts 
for these changes, a regression model was constructed in which the 
dependent variable was 1 if the respondent voted for the Democratic 
candidate and 0 if he or she voted for the Republican. The independent 
variables were constructed to yield a two-way layout with six party 
identification categories (excluding Iridependents) and the four infor­
mational categories with all interaction terms included. If the changes 
in Table 7 are due solely to change in the marginal distribution of 
party identifiers, then the estimated parameters should not c�ange 
betWeen 1958 and 1964, 1966, 1968 and 1970. If, on the other hand, 
some of the change in that table is due to a changing propensity of 
citizens in a given category of information and party affiliation to 
vote Democratic, there should be a change in the parameters between 
1958 and each of the four following elections -- 1964, 1966, 1968 
and 1970. 
The statistical model and estimation procedure are given 
in the Appendix as are the coefficient estimates for each of the 
equations. Of particular interest was the null hypothesis, i.e. , 
that no parametric change had occurred between 1958 and each of the 
four later elections. This hypothesis was rejected at the .01 level 
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in every case. Thus� the present evidence indicates that not all of 
the changes from 1958 can be accounted for by the changing distrib�tion
of party identifiers. At least some of the change in voting behavior 
has occurred Within party identification levels. 
This finding suggests that while political observers have 
been lamenting or celebrating, depending on their inclinations, the 
decline in the number of partisan identifiers, a related sort of 
change has been occurring. Those people who still identify with one 
of the parties seem to be using it less and less as a cue in making 
their voting decisions in congressional elections. 
DISCUSSION 
The main purpose of this paper is to elucidate and examine 
critically the priilcipal explanations proffered by scholars for the 
widely observed decline in the number of marginal seats. By and large 
the view advanced by Burnham .and Erikson, that a behavioral change 
accounts for the decline, has received the greatest support. Voters 
are different than they used to be, and not merely because there are 
more Independents. The party identifiers seem recently to be more 
responsive to nonpartisan criteria for decisionmaking in House 
elections· than they have been in the past, and in that sense they 
are behaving more like the Independents. 
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As Tufte pointed out, the decline in the number of marginal 
seats may have the effect of mediating the responsiveness of House 
elections to national tides. The claim here is that the cause of this 
phenomenon is to be found in a shift in the behavior of the electo.rate. 
Perhaps, as .some analysts suggest, the change in electoral behavior is 
rooted in an increased unwillingness of voters to utilize party 
identification as a voting cue. This possibility is certainly consis­
tent with many other findings, For example, Tufte, and Arseneau and 
Wolfinger report that party identification accounts for a decreasing 
proportion of the congressional vote over time. 23 At the level of 
congressional voting the decreasing reliance on party as a 11shorthand11 
cue may not turn voters toward issue voting but may simply increase 
their reliance on other rules of thumb such as incumbency or satisfac­
tion with presidential performance. This would be a curious consequence, 
since it would suggest that increased issue voting in presidential 
elections and the declining number of cOmpetitive House districts have 
essentially the same causes. As the voters come to approximate more 
closely the 11ideal citizens" of certain democratic theories, they may 
(inadvertently) end up insulating their congressmen from defea,t and 
hence to some extent redU:ce their representatives' incentive to respond 
to constituent des.ires. 
Indeed, recent research reported by Kernell indicates· that 
the perceived performance of the President in office has a pronounced 
effect on individual citizens in deciding whether and how to vote in 
off-year elections. 24 Tufte found that at the aggregate level, 
presidential performance was an important variable in accounting for 
the midterm votes. Such findings suggest that the scarcity and 
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resulting costliness of information in congressional elections forces 
most citizens to rely on simple decision-rules in deciding how to cast 
their votes. The decision rules that currently seem to be operating 
in the electorate are based on·party ·affiliation, presidential perfor-
mance, and incumbency. The findings in this paper suggest that voters 
seem to be shifting away from the use of party affiliation as a 
decision rule and toward increased utilization of incumbency. I have 
had nothing at all to say about the fact that voters apparently also 
respond to presidential performance in deciding how to cast their vote. 
If the importance of this explanatory component is increasing, then at 
least the partisan makeup of Congress may end up being quite responsive 
to national forces. 
Given the limited quantity of data presented here and the 
difficulty of ascertaining voter responsiveness to national forces in 
the SRC data, only guesses and speculations can be advanced about the 
significance of the results reported here. One effect of the apparent 
increase in the electorate's use of incumbency as a voting cue has been 
to decrease the proportion of competitive seats. We might conjecture 
that a congressman with a safe seat would be less concerned with 
27 
responding to constituency demands. I hesitate to endorse this 
conclusion since part of the explanation of the increased incumbency 
effect may be found in the increased ability of sitting congressmen 
to satisfy constituency requests. Indeed, the increasing decentraliza-
tion of the policymaking process in the Congress would seem to point 
in this direction. It may still be true that if a congressman decides 
not to make use of his many opportunities to assist his constituents, 
he would not benefit from any incumbency advantage. Indeed. congress·-
men and congressional scholars are able to recount many stories 
illustrati_ng this very point. Obviously much more research is needed 
to settle these questions. 
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APPENDIX: PROCEDURES 
The following regression equation formed the basis for the 
analysis in the discussion of Behavioral Change Theories in this paper: 
The regression equation that was estimated was 
where 
(A.I) yk 
yk = l 
xlk = l 
xzk = l 
x3k = l 
x4k = l 
5 3 5 3 
a + P Sixik i= 1 
+ I:  y,z,k + I:  i= 1 l l i= 1 
� 6 . .  x ik zjk j "'i lJ 
+ eik, 
. if respondent voted for Democratic candidate 
0 if respondent. voted for Republican candidate_ 
if respondent is a strong Democrat 
0 otherwise 
1 if respondent is weak Democrat 
0 otherwise 
if respondent is independent leaning Democrat 
0 otherwise 
1 if respondent �s independent leaning Republican 
0 otherwise 
xsk = l if respondent is weak Republican 0 otherwise 
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